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THE MYTH OF BLACK JUROR NULLIFICATION:
RACISM DRESSED UP IN
JURISPRUDENTIAL CLOTHING*
Elissa Krausst and Martha Schulmantt
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, African-American (and other "minority") jurors
have regularly been accused of judging cases on preconceived race-based
notions about justice rather than on the evidence.' Anecdotal accounts of
a handful of allegedly race-based acquittals are bolstered by statistics
claiming to show higher rates of acquittal and hung juries in jurisdictions
where African-Americans and other people of color have become the
majority. Critics argue that people of color have transformed a color-
blind system into one that is color-sensitive. The implication is that as
juries have become more representative, race has been injected into the
justice system where it was previously absent. Such claims strike at the
very core of principles of fairness and justice. They are both a shield for
racial prejudice and an attack on the American jury system itself. The
message of such claims is that rather than following the law and protect-
ing the innocent, the real job of juries is to convict.
This article looks first at changes in the way that courts have treated
black participation in the jury system and then moves to an overview of
fundamental legal principles underlying jury decision making. We then
consider how African-American jurors' adherence to these principles has
* @ Copyright 1997, National Jury Project, Inc.
t Elissa Krauss has been a trial consultant since 1975 with the National Jury Project, a
professional firm of trial consultants with offices in New York, Minneapolis, and Oakland,
California. Ms. Krauss has been instrumental in using social science research to understand
juror attitudes and behavior. She has assisted trial litigators in assessing jurors. She has also
conducted jury research in twenty-three states and twenty-six federal districts. She is the edi-
tor and a contributing author of Jurywork: Systematic Techniques, the leading practice manual
for attorneys, covering the full range of jury trial practice issues. See JutmwoP, : SYsTEmAric
TECHNQUES (Elissa Krauss and Beth Bonora eds., 1996).
t Martha Schulman is a researcher and writer based in New York City. The daughter of
Jay Schulman, a founder of both the field of systematic jury work and the National Jury Pro-
ject, she has a longstanding interest in juries and other legal issues.
The authors wish to thank Kara Davis, Elizabeth Bochnak, Anita Hargrove, and Harriet
Grimm for their helpful insights and suggestions, and for their calmness and perseverance
under pressure. In addition, Professor Kim Taylor-Thompson was kind enough to read the
manuscript and provide helpful feedback.
1 We use quotation marks on the term "minority," because minority groups as a whole
are fast becoming the majority. See discussion infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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been wrongly characterized as a pattern of nullification that undermines
the system. We go on to discuss differences between black and white
experiences and attitudes, emphasizing that in a racially divided society
only whites have the luxury of claiming to be color blind. In conclusion,
we argue that the myth of black juror nullification is a racist attack on the
jury system motivated in part by a desire to limit the impact of "minor-
ity" peoples' experiences on the justice system.
I. THE CHANGING ROLE OF "MINORITIES" IN THE
JURY SYSTEM
This contemporary emergence of broad attacks on black jurors is
ironic in light of this country's long history of excluding persons of color
from juries.2 The requirement that jury pools represent a fair cross-sec-
tion of eligible jurors, though widely acknowledged as a bedrock princi-
ple today, is relatively recent. This principle was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in the 1940s, and then federally codified in 1968. 3 In-
creased representativeness of jury pools, however, did not eliminate sys-
tematic discrimination, for prosecutors still used peremptory challenges
to ensure that juries stayed mainly white.4
Only a decade ago, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky 5 pro-
hibited the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to accomplish
the illegal exclusion of minorities already prohibited at other phases of
the jury selection system.6 Batson and its progeny forced those attempt-
ing to strip juries of cognizable classes to be more creative in efforts to
2 In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional laws that
prohibited black participation in the jury system. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). However, that opinion
was readily sidestepped for many decades. Key man systems, blue ribbon juries, and source
lists composed of those who had paid poll taxes and passed citizenship tests were all used to
prevent black participation.
3 See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Jury Selection and Service Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1861.
4 Prosecutors' purposeful and systematic use of peremptory challenges was recently
highlighted by release of a 1986 audio tape of a training session where Philadelphia District
Attorneys were told that "the blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to convict ....
[ Y] ou don't want those people on your jury." Former Philadelphia Prosecutor Accused of
Racial Bias: A Tape and Dispute in an Election Year, N.Y. TIMs, Apr. 3, 1997, at A14. The
same year, Oust before the Supreme Court's Batson decision) one author of this article ob-
served a Philadelphia D.A. use six of his seven peremptory challenges to eliminate African-
American jurors. See infra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
5 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
6 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-96. The Batson Court reasoned that prosecutors should not
be able to use peremptory challenges to accomplish the illegal discrimination already prohib-
ited at other phases of the jury selection system. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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preserve the all white jury.7 Despite these efforts, in some jurisdictions
juries have become more representative.8
Blacks-along with Hispanics and Asians-now serve on juries in
greater numbers than ever before. In some jurisdictions, "minorities" are
the majority in the jury pool, as they are in the broader community. 9
Sometimes they are the majority on a specific jury. One such case was
the O.J. Simpson criminal trial. As is well known, that jury's verdict was
harshly criticized, and the jurors themselves were subjected to ad
hominem attacks.
A groundswell of white public opinion accused the Simpson jurors
(nine of whom are African-American) of reaching the wrong conclusion.
Their relatively brief period of deliberation was often cited as proof that
they had not really considered the evidence. Yet their accusers had
themselves reached the opposite conclusion in the same short period of
time and without any formal deliberation at all. 10
The Simpson verdict unleashed a host of voices claiming that the
jury system was in crisis. Articles in mass media sources, ranging from
the Wall Street Journal to The New Yorker to Readers Digest, raised the
specter of too many wrongful acquittals and too many hung juries caused
by jurors whose narrow focus on their own experiences resulted in exces-
7 Suspicious explanations for systematic use of peremptory challenges to eliminate Afri-
can-American jurors have been routinely upheld. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 265 (1995)
(unkempt hair and suspicious mustaches and beards of two men); United States v. Harrell, 847
F.2d 138, 139 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 371 (1988) (lack of secondary educa-
tion); see also United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1045 (1991) (youth and/or unemployment status); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1991) (young women who lived with partners and/or
had children with no indication of being married). See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Uncon-
scious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. RPv. 1016, 1023-24 (1988).
8 This is due in part to widespread reforms designed to increase representativeness in-
cluding use of multiple source lists and one-day one trial systems, elimination of exemptions,
and increased pay for jurors. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Re-
form Efforts, 79 JuDICATURE 5 (1996).
9 The number of such jurisdictions is very small. African-Americans are the majority in
only fifteen U.S. cities with populations over one hundred thousand (Atlanta (GA), Baltimore
(MD), Birmingham (AL), Detroit (MI), Gary (IN), Inglewood (CA), Jackson (MS), Macon
(GA), Memphis (TN), Newark (NJ), New Orleans (LA), Richmond (VA), Savannah (GA), and
Washington (D.C.)). In eleven other cities with over one hundred thousand inhabitants, the
combined population of blacks, Asians, and Hispanics exceeds fifty percent (including New
York City and Los Angeles). See BUREAu OF TaE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMwMRcE, CrrIEs
Wrn 100,000 OR MORE INsmBrrANTs iN 1994, Table 46 (1996). We do not know how many
of these cities are using jury selection procedures that assure representativeness of their jury
pools. We do know, however, that in the United States today, most people who are not white
live in places where they are the minority. For example, only one-third of African-Americans
live in the twenty-six places mentioned here.
10 We maintain that media consumers and commentators who accused the jurors of
reaching the wrong conclusion too quickly had themselves concluded in the.same period of
time (more likely, earlier and without any formal deliberation at all) that Simpson was guilty.
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sive skepticism of police and prosecutors."I Who are the jurors thought
to be causing such havoc? The same ones who until recently were ex-
cluded from the process: African-Americans.
Black jurors (and sometimes other "minorities") have been accused
of tainting justice by: (a) prejudging based on race; (b) expressing skepti-
cism about police testimony that white jurors and white observers find
credible; and, (c) empathizing with the troubled lives of some black de-
fendants.12 The critics imply that these attitudes result in the guilty go-
ing free, while the jury system goes to hell. The equation is quite simple:
black defendant + black jurors + non-conviction = miscarriage of justice.
II. THE JURY'S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The critique of African-American jurors is an attack on the most
basic principles of the jury system. Black jurors are being condemned
for doing exactly what jurors are supposed to do: demanding that the
prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. All jurors are ex-
pected to begin by presuming innocence. However, this hallmark of our
system is by no means universally understood or followed. Our surveys,
conducted by the National Jury Project in jurisdictions throughout the
nation over the last twenty years, consistently find that between 15% and
45% of juror-eligible respondents believe that a person who is brought to
trial is probably guilty; more than 50% typically expect defendants to
prove their innocence despite judges' instructions to the contrary. 13 It is
often difficult to find jurors who understand and will follow the two bed-
rock principles of our criminal justice system: (1) the defendant is pre-
sumed innocent; and, (2) the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. When jurors who abide by these principles appear on
juries they should be applauded, not condemned.
A defendant remains cloaked in the presumption of innocence until
the jury starts deliberations. The jury usually completes its work by find-
ing the defendant either guilty or not guilty. 14 If jurors are not satisfied
that the prosecution has met its burden, the jury must acquit. A "not
guilty" verdict does not mean, however, that the jurors believe the de-
fendant is innocent. A "not guilty" verdict means only that the state has
not met its burden of proof.15
11 See infra notes 19, 21, 42, 50, 57, 72, 77, 91.
12 See infra notes 18, 19, 21, 40 and accompanying text.
13 See JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 (Elissa Krauss & Beth
Bonora eds., 1996).
14 A hung jury is also a legitimate though much maligned trial outcome. See infra note
32 and accompanying text.
15 A Simpson criminal trial juror has pointed out that she never found Simpson innocent.
See Nikol G. Alexander and Drucilla Cornell, Dismissed or Banished? A Testament to the
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Post-trial juror interviews conducted by the National Jury Project
over many years have shown that in most instances where jurors acquit,
at least some of them had the "feeling" that the defendant probably "did
it" or at least did "something" wrong, but the government's case did not
stand up to reasonable doubt scrutiny. 16 These acquittals are not the re-
sult of juror error or bias, but rather the result of jurors' obedience to
their sworn obligation.
Jurors are given a tremendous amount of power to evaluate evi-
dence and judge credibility. Our system expects ordinary citizens to
draw on their experiences and reach reasoned conclusions based in part
on common sense. The system is organized around the principle that
members of the community should decide whether or not a person should
be deprived of liberty. This is because, as the Supreme Court has em-
phasized, "community participation" is "consistent with our democratic
heritage" and is "critical to public confidence in the fairness of the crimi-
nal justice system."'17
In a racially divided country like the U.S., it is not surprising that
black and white jurors bring different experiences into the courtroom.
One common difference is that black jurors' life experiences lead them to
have an easier time imposing as high a standard of credibility on police
as on other witnesses, and demanding that prosecutors prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. When they do so, they are accused of nullify-
ing; that is, of deciding cases not on evidence, but on some
predisposition or understanding of a higher law.' Today, nullification
has become a catch phrase to explain the fact that some black jurors
reach conclusions unlike those expected or desired by some whites.
Im. PERPETUATING THE NULLIFICATION MYTH
It is rare that the source of a new and widely promoted myth can be
pinpointed. In this instance, however, the genesis of the idea that a pat-
tern of black jury nullification is eroding the jury system can be traced to
a Wall Street Journal article the day after the Simpson criminal trial ver-
Reasonableness of the Simpson Jury, in BnRTH OF A NATION'HOOD 57, 71 (Morrison et al. eds.,
1997).
16 The National Jury Project has conducted thousands of post-trial interviews with jurors.
See JuRYwoRi, supra note 13, at §§13.01[01] and accompanying text.
17 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
18 The power to nullify has been subject to debate throughout the history of American
jurisprudence. It is both feared and venerated. Despite this ambivalence, the jury's right to
decide a case by its own lights without fear of outside coercion or pressure remains a hallmark
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Thomas E. Williging, Changing
Views of Jury Power: The Nullification Debate, 1787-1988, 15 LAW & HUM. BHAav. 165, 166
(1991). This issue has been discussed most recently in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606
(2d Cir. 1997).
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dict.19 In that article, the authors opine that the justice system is in cri-
sis.20 They support their claim with statistics and anecdotal reports of
individual trials; neither stands up to close scrutiny. The statistics are
inaccurate and highly misleading. 21 The trial anecdotes are incomplete
and slanted towards the prosecution. The Wall Street Journal article jux-
taposes a supposed national acquittal rate of 17%, with trial outcome
statistics from three jurisdictions. They report that in the Bronx, juries
acquit in 47.6% of felony trials; in Washington D.C., 28.7% of defend-
ants are acquitted; and in Wayne County, jurors acquit 30% of the time.22
The statistics simply do not support the authors' position. Roger
Parloff carefully reviewed the available data and concluded that a na-
tional acquittal rate of 17% is neither accepted by experts, nor is it verifi-
able.23 An acquittal rate of about 28% is more realistic.24  Hence,
Wayne County and Washington, D.C. are right in line with the national
average.25 The "Bronx jury," a phenomenon well-known in New York
legal circles, apparently do acquit at a rate above the national average.26
To examine the causes and implications of the Bronx statistics,
Parloff wisely followed two investigative paths. First, he asked those
who practice in Bronx courtrooms what they have to say about acquittal
rates. Second, he tested the black racism hypothesis by comparing the
rates of acquittal for black, Hispanic and white defendants in the
Bronx.27 Parloff found that judges and lawyers who practice in the
Bronx do not feel there is a race-based crisis.28 In fact, practitioners
from the bench and from both sides of the bar reported that, in their
experience, Bronx jurors are skeptical about police testimony and hold
the government to the required high burden of proof.29 One Bronx Dis-
trict Attorney with twenty-four years of experience told Parloff, "Basi-
cally the quality of the prosecution will determine whether you get a
19 See Benjamin Holden et al., Color Blinded? Race Seems to Play an Increasing Role in
Many Jury Verdicts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at Al.
20 See id.
21 See Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain't Broke... , THE AMERicAN LAWYER,
June 1997, at 5.
22 See Holden et al., supra note 19, at Al. But note that Washington, D.C. and Wayne
County, Michigan are predominantly black; the Bronx majority is black and Hispanic.
23 Parloff, supra note 21, at 6.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See id. at 6-7.
27 See id. at 7.
28 Neither do those in Wayne County. Parloff talked to the Chief of Administration
there, who expressed surprise that his acquittal rate was considered high, since his convictions
are up from ten or fifteen years ago. A Wayne County prosecutor has a simple explanation for
acquittals: "the People simply fail to sustain the burden of proving guilt." Id.
29 See id.
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verdict in a case."' 30 Parloff also found virtually identical rates of acquit-
tal by Bronx juries of white, black and Hispanic defendants. 31
Thus, the acquittal rate in the Bronx is apparently caused by a com-
bination of two factors: (1) jurors who are doing their jobs well, (2) pros-
ecutors who are not doing their jobs so well. There is no reason to
believe that the Bronx D.A.'s office is any less competent or efficient
than any other urban prosecutor's office. Therefore, if the Bronx exam-
ple teaches us anything, it is that there is a dangerously high conviction
rate elsewhere.
If the national acquittal rate is around 28%, then the conviction rate
is around 72%.32 Approximately, three out of every four of the very few
arrests that actually lead to trial result in conviction.33 As any seasoned
litigator knows, the cases that go to trial are usually the ones where the
evidence is not clear cut. Each side reasonably thinks it has a chance of
winning. In most jurisdictions, however, the prosecution routinely does
better than the odds.34 The Bronx outcomes are closer to what would be
expected, if both sides actually did start out equally. Therefore, the con-
viction rates elsewhere most likely reflect the pro-prosecution biases held
by many jurors.3 5
If the statistics in the Wall Street Journal article do not stand up to
scrutiny, then we can only rely on the trial anecdotes. However, they too
wilt under close scrutiny. The cases are presented as if guilt was proven.
No information has been given about the police investigation, the credi-
bility or self-interest of police or other witnesses, or on what the defense
case was based-surely an incomplete picture of any criminal trial. With
such a skewed picture, the reader is led blindly to believe that black
jurors are choosing to "disregard the evidence, however powerful. '36
Only enough information is given to reinforce the race-based equa-
tion. One case that has become ubiquitous involved the Baltimore trial
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 See supra note 21 and text accompanying note 24.
33 According to the Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, which tracks
felony arrests in forty counties, only six percent of thirteen thousand such arrests in a given
year go to trial-including both judge and jury trials.
34 See generally BUREAU OF JusTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENDIUM
OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1993) (providing statistics encompassing all aspects of
processing in the federal justice system, including the number of persons prosecuted in federal
criminal cases and post-conviction rates); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relation Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 23, 76 (1997); Anne Bowen Pou-
lin, Prosecution Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Prosecution After United
States v. Armstrong, 34 Am. CRai. L. REv. 1071, 1125 (1996); Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplat-
ing the Successive Prosecution Phenomena in the Federal System, 85 J. CrIM. L. & CRu.MUoL-
OGY 625 (1995).
35 See JuRYwoRK, supra note 13, at §2.04.
36 Holden et al., supra note 19, at Al.
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of a black man accused of murdering a white man.37 Other than a broad
outline of the case, the only thing the reader learns is that prior to an
acquittal, the sole non-black juror, a Pakistani-American, sent a note to
the judge indicating that race "may be playing a part" in the delibera-
tions. 38 We are told that several eyewitnesses testified at the trial. No
reference is made to questions raised or arguments made by the defense
about the eyewitnesses or any other evidence in the case. Nor is there
any mention of the widespread understanding today that eyewitness testi-
mony to a crime is extremely unreliable. 39 The reader of the article
knows only that a white was killed, a black was charged, there were 11
black jurors, a Pakistani-American juror wrote a note, and the case failed
to end in conviction. Black defendant + black jurors + non-conviction =
miscarriage of justice.
The "lessons" of the Journal article can be found subsequently in
Reader's Digest, the ABA Journal, and elsewhere with the same statistics
and similar anecdotal reporting. 40 The anecdotes and statistics are rein-
forced by references to Professor Paul Butler's thoughtful and provoca-
tive argument, that in a country where so many young black men are
under supervision by the criminal justice system, nullifying in some
cases is a moral choice.4 1 Mere reference by white commentators to Pro-
fessor Butler's thesis does not, however, tell us if jurors are acting in
accordance with his recommendations. In fact, close scrutiny of some
published anecdotal accounts reveals that rather than a pattern of "nullifi-
cation," there is a pattern of law abiding jurors doing their jobs who are
being attacked because the authors do not like the resulting outcomes.
The myth of black juror nullification has been perpetuated in other
articles that rely primarily on prosecution-biased anecdotal accounts. 42
Clyde Haberman's New York Times column describing the outcome of a
trial of two Hispanic defendants is illustrative.43 After two days of acri-
monious deliberations, a multi-racial, multi-ethnic Manhattan jury re-
mained divided 7 to 5 for acquittal. The minority voting to convict,
37 See Daniel Levine, Race Over Reason in the Jury Box, READER'S DIGEST, June 1996.
38 Holden et al., supra note 19, at Al.
39 See ELIZABETH F. LoFrUs, EYEWrrNESs TESTmONY 78 (1979); see also Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Powerful Eyewitness Testimony; Lessons From the Research, 24 TRIAL 64 (Apr.
1988); see generally L. CRAIG PARKER, EYE WrrNEsS TESTiMONY: JURY BEHAVIOR (1980).
40 See Henry Reske, Critics Claiming Race Affects Verdicts: Statistics Show Higher Ac-
quittal Rates for Primarily Black Juries in Some Areas, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 26 (here the
statistics are reported uncritically); see also Lemer, supra note 32, in RAcE AND Ta CRiMINAL
JusncE SYSTEM: How RACE AFFEcrs JuRY TRiAs 85, 91-96 (Gerald A. Reynolds ed., 1996).
41 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 690-91 (1995).
42 See Clyde Haberman, Color Blind? Justice, Maybe, But Not Juries, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
26, 1995, at B39; Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, THE NEw YORKER, Feb. 24/Mar. 3, 1997,
at 54-64.
43 Haberman, supra note 42.
[Vol. 7:57
BLACK JUROR NULLIFICATION
made up of three non-Hispanic whites and two Asians, is characterized
as having accepted "on faith" the principle that the system can be "color-
blind." 44 The black and Hispanic majority voting to acquit, in contrast,
is alleged to have "taken out their social frustrations in deliberations" and
to have concluded "right off' that the defendants were "victims of false
prosecution." 45
Lost in Haberman's vignette is any understanding of where the bur-
den of proof lies. The burden is first on the prosecutor and then it is on
those favoring conviction. It is never on those advocating for acquittal.
Nevertheless, Haberman depicts the jurors who voted to acquit as intran-
sigent and obstructionist. The reality is that by having accepted the pre-
sumption of innocence and deciding that the state failed to meet its
burden, the jurors fulfilled their obligation. This acquitting majority was,
in fact, silenced by an intransigent, conviction-oriented minority which
failed to fulfill its burden of persuading the others.
Apparently, the 7 to 5 division began with the first vote. It is well-
established that in 9 out of 10 cases, a jury's final verdict accords with
the verdict supported initially by the majority of jurors.46 But Haberman
is quick to convict the minority jurors, who were the majority on this
jury, for preventing deliberation. Their crime appears to be a refusal to
go along with the minority who agreed with the prosecution.47
IV. "COLOR-BLINDNESS" AS A PROP FOR THE
NULLIFICATION MYTH
The African-American and Hispanic jurors in Haberman's vignette
were attacked on the ground that their actions were color-sensitive when
they ought to have been color-blind. Thus, Haberman joins a parade of
recent commentators holding up color-blindness as the ideal for jurors
and as a salient feature of the justice system in the days before black
jurors injected their race-based perspective.48 White jurors are assumed
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See HARRY KALViN JR. & HANs ZE SEL, THE AmBRcAN JuRy 488 (1966). Although
reported thirty years ago, no published research since has replaced these findings. National
Jury Project post-trial juror interviews confirm this pattern.
47 That the convicting minority was intransigent is reinforced by the comment that "some
of those who voted guilty now say they are not convinced the state built an airtight case."
Haberman, supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. If they had attempted to deliberate and
persuade based on evidence, perhaps they would have reached this realization earlier.
48 This formulation can be found in the use of the phrase in titles of articles about black
jurors, starting with the source article in the Wall Street Journal. See Holden, supra note 19;
Jeffrey Abramson, After the O.J. Trial: The Quest to Create a Color-Blind Jury, THE CHRoNi-
CLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 3, 1995, at B1; Michael Meyers, The Racial Divide: Color-
blinded Jurors, in RACE AND =z CaMINAL JusncE SYSTEM: How RACE AFFECrs JURY TRi-
ALs 41-45 (Gerald Reynolds ed., 1996); see also Haberman, supra notes 43-44,46 and accom-
panying text.
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to be color-blind. The true history of race-based wrongful convictions
(and acquittals) wrought by white supremacy is ignored.
In the past, the concept that color-blindness was the desirable way
to organize society was inextricably linked to the goal of racial equality.
Today, the dream that children would be judged for the content of their
character rather than the color of their skin49 has been co-opted. Color-
blindness has come to stand for a denial of the existence of race as a
factor in American social relations and in Americans' perceptions. This
new understanding can be found in many sources, including Republican
rhetoric about affirmative action 5° and in Supreme Court opinions. 51
49 Dr. Martin Luther King delivered the I Have a Dream speech on 28 August 1963.
[Editor's comment] This is, perhaps, the most well-known and most quoted address Dr. King
delivered. He gave the speech before Lincoln Memorial as the keynote address of the March
on Washington, D.C., for Civil Rights. The television cameras allowed the entire nation to
hear and see him plead for justice and freedom. Mrs. Coretta King once commented, "At that
moment it seemed as if the Kingdom of God appeared. But it only lasted for a moment." The
following is an excerpt from this moving I Have a Dream speech:
I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, sons of former slaves
and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of
brotherhood.
I have a dream that one day, even the state of Mississippi, a states weltering
with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed
into an oasis of freedom and justice.
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its
governors having his lips dripping with the words of interposition and nullification,
that one day, right there in Alabama, little black boys and black girls will be able to
join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers. I have a
dream today!
I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and moun-
tain shall be made low, the rough places shall be made plain, and the crooked places
shall be made straight and the glory of the Lord will be revealed and all flesh shall
see it together.
This is our hope. This is the faith that I go back to the South with. With this
faith we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful
symphony of brotherhood.
With this faith we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle
together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we
will be free one day. This will be the day when all of God's children will be able to
sing with new meaning--"my country 'tis of thee; sweet land of liberty; of thee I
sing; land where my father died, land of the pilgrim's pride; from every mountain
side, let freedom ring"-and if America is to be a great nation, this must become
true....
Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE 217, 219-20 (James
Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
50 See Newt Gingrich & Ward Connerly, Face the Failure of Racial Preferences, N.Y.
TiMEs, June 15, 1997, at El5.
51 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980); Minnick v. California Depart-
ment of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 128 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1981); see also
Meyers, supra note 48, in RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSncE SYSTEM: How RACE AFFECTs
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Exalting color-blindness as the goal of a multi-racial society is
deeply problematic. Color-blindness is impossible because everyone no-
tices racial differences both in daily life and in the courtroom. Contem-
porary advocates of color-blindness seem to hope that upon noticing
racial differences, everyone will immediately ignore them.52 But the re-
ality is that as soon as race is noticed, people attach their pre-existing
beliefs and assumptions to it.53 Therefore, calls for color-blindness ob-
scure prejudice and become a prop for existing racial injustice. Such
calls begin with the premise that race can be ignored. That race affects
attitudes and behavior is well-established in social science research
which has shown, over and over again, that Americans are not color-
blind.54 For more than fifty years, researchers have found that the facts
of race and racial difference affect attitudes and behavior in measurable
and sometimes disturbing ways.55
Most interesting are "unobtrusive studies" in which research sub-
jects are not told that racial attitudes or prejudice is being studied.56 Sub-
jects are led to believe that researchers are studying some attitude or
behavior not related to race-such as effectiveness of punishment as a
teaching tool, helping behavior, or the ways in which jurors interpret
different types of evidence. The findings consistently show that both at-
titudinal and behavioral responses vary in response to the sole change of
race.57 Such variations indicate that bias and prejudice (which often ex-
ist below the conscious level) are affecting attitudes and actions.
JURY TRALS 85 41 (Gerald A. Reynolds ed., 1996); see generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
52 See Gotanda, supra note 51, at 18.
53 See id.
54 See Reske, supra note 40, at 26 and accompanying text; Lerner, surpa note 32, in
RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JusrICE SYsTEm: How RACE Ai'FEcrs JuRY TRIALS 85 96 (Gerald A.
Reynolds ed., 1996).
55 Fifty years ago Allport and Postman, while studying rumor, found that fifty percent of
the time, whites shown a picture of a well-dressed black man conversing with a white man
who was holding a razor blade, transposed the races of the two men when asked to describe the
picture to another person. In some cases, the black man was even reported to be brandishing
the razor threateningly. See GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO PosTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
RUMOR 56-64, 89-94 (1947).
56 See Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black White Discrimination and
Prejudice, 87 PSYCHOLOGicAL BuLL=nN 546 (1980). In these studies all factors are kept con-
stant except the race of research targets (the object of the behavior being explored) or other
parties relevant to the study.
57 One such study sheds light on reactions of some whites to the Simpson trial outcomes.
White male subjects were led to believe they were inflicting electric shocks on research
targets. The race of the man to be shocked was varied. The subject was also led to believe
that the man was romantically involved with a woman whose race was also varied. The sub-
jects consistently inflicted the highest level of electric shock on the black targets who they
believed were romantically involved with a white woman. See Gary I. Schulman, Race, Sex,
and Violence: A Laboratory Test, 79 AM. J. Soc. 1260, 1270-71 (1974).
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Studies of the influence of race in jury decision making echo these
results. All have found that, in most cases, race has some influence on
both black and white research participants. 58 In many instances, racial
prejudice is the only explanation for disparities in white jurors' readiness
to convict, impose harsher sentences, predict recidivism, or take into ac-
count evidence that they have been told to ignore when considering the
fate of minority-race defendants.5 9 Race and racism, therefore, affect
outcomes even when they are not asked about, not explicitly mentioned,
and would probably be denied.
Denying that race or racism exists is possible only for whites whose
majority status allows them to assume that they do not have a race.60
Since whiteness is the norm, whites can ignore race until it intrudes, dis-
rupting the fantasy of a color-blind world.61 It is our experience that
because race and the reality of being of minority status are facts of life
for people who are not white, they are more willing than whites to name
it.
V. NO TALKING ABOUT RACISM, PLEASE
National Jury Project post-trial interviews and mock trial research
show that minority people are more willing than are whites to discuss
race. 62 For an extraordinary example of whites' desire to avoid race and
This study may provide a clue to the visceral outpouring of glee celebrating the civil trial
outcome. For example, on the day following the civil trial verdict, The New York Times ran a
photo of a group of white men in a bar with glasses raised in a toast, as jubilant over the news
of the verdict as if it were a personal victory. See Carey Goldberg, Subdued Pandemonium,
Color-Coded Responses, N.Y. TIMsS, Feb. 5, 1997, at Al.
58 See Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution
of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. ExPERmMNrAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 140 (1979); John L. Ber-
nard, Interactions Between the Race of the Defendant and That of Jurors in Determining Ver-
dicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. Rv. 103, 109 (1979).
59 See Randall A. Gordon et al., Perceptions of Blue-collar and White-collar Crime: the
Effect of Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 191, 195 (1988)
(discussing expected recidivism); James D. Johnson et al., Justice is Still Not Color-blind:
Differential Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALrrY & SOc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 893, 896 (1995); see also Laura T. Sweeney & Craig Haney, The Influence of
Race on Sentencing: A Meta-analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCL & L.
179, 190 (1992); see generally Sherry Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, in
CRmcAL RACE THEORY: THE CrrrnNG EDGE 180-90 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
60 See Tina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (or Other-isms), in CRTcAL
RACE THEoRY: THE Cut-INro EDGE 564-72 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
61 See id. at 569.
62 National Jury Project mock trial research is conducted in connection with trial prepa-
ration. Mock jurors are carefully selected to reflect the demographic characteristics in the trial
jurisdiction. Balanced summary arguments of each side of a case being prepared for trial are
presented. Mock jurors then deliberate. Though the research is sponsored by one side, care-
ful attention is paid to having balanced presentations. This is because the research goal is to
improve presentation and test for juror comprehension and questions. National Jury Project
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African-Americans' willingness to discuss it, consider the case of a white
woman suing her employer for wrongful termination. 63 She had a
number of claims, including a claim of race discrimination (based on
documented expressions of bias by an African-American supervisor). In
two different mock juries, white jurors ignored her race discrimination
claim, reaching verdicts in her favor on the other issues in the case. In
each jury, an African-American juror reminded the others of the race
discrimination claim, spoke of its credibility in light of his experience,
and persuaded the others to find in the plaintiff's favor on the race dis-
crimination claim as they had on her other claims.64
The extreme hesitation whites have about mentioning race and ra-
cism can result in disapproval of whites who are willing to address these
issues head on. A wrongful termination claim by two men, an African-
American and his white supervisor, is illustrative.65 The two were fired
after the white supervisor refused to follow a directive to fire the Afri-
can-American man. The white supervisor told his boss he believed the
termination order was motivated by racism. Rather than being viewed as
a hero, the white man was seen by white jurors in two mock juries as
having brought his termination upon himself by bringing up an issue that
did not affect him. The jurors were sympathetic to the black man "who
had no choice" and were critical of the white man who, they felt, could
have simply avoided the problem.
Whites do not like to talk about race, and overt expressions of ra-
cism have become socially unacceptable. But racism, although more
covert, is alive and well.66 One "litmus test" question that has been
shown over many decades to successfully uncover racial bias, even in
subjects who claim-to be free of such attitudes, has been willingness to
accept interracial marriage.67 A 1997 Gallup Poll found that 61% of
trial consultants conduct and analyze the research. Elissa Krauss conducted the mock jury
research described in this article. National Jury Project research results are shared with coun-
sel and presented in summary form for educational purposes. Work product, privilege and
other rules requiring confidentiality are strictly adhered to in reporting results.
63 See supra text accompanying note 62.
64 See supra text accompanying note 62.
65 See supra text accompanying note 62.
66 Johnson cites a host of studies of "aversive racism," the kind that is largely hidden,
denied, and often even unconscious. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1027 and accompanying
text; see also Charles R. Lawrence IH, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STA. L. REv. 317 (1987) (discussing the property of the doctrine of
discriminatory purpose).
67 One reason why the question about interracial marriage is effective is that it asks
respondents to imagine elimination of social distance between the races. See John C. Brigham
et al., Dimensions of Racial Attitudes: Interracial Marriage and Approaches to Equality, 32 J.
Soc. Issus 9 (1976). As a general matter, no single question can uncover racial bias. See
generally John J. Woodmansee & Stuart W. Cook, Dimensions of Verbal Racial Attitudes:
Their Identification and Measurement, 7 J. PERSONALrry & SOC. PSYCHOL. 240 (1967).
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whites approve of marriage between blacks and whites as compared to
only 25% in 1972.68
While the 1997 poll suggests an improvement, the ramifications of
the continuing disapproval among 39% are worth examining. Our Na-
tional Jury Project research in several different jurisdictions has found
that whites who disapprove of interracial marriage are also less open to a
black person's claim that he has been discriminated against, and more
likely to acquit a white police officer accused of brutalizing a black per-
son.69 Thus, whites' negative views of interracial marriage continue to
be indicators of other racially biased predispositions.
VI. WHEN THE POLICE ARE NOT YOUR FRIENDS: BLACK
EXPERIENCE WITH THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Research reminds us what reasonable people, regardless of their
race, should already know. Race affects how you see what you see. Peo-
ple are not color-blind. What a person living in the U.S. knows about the
world is shaped in part by that person's race. It is as preposterous to
expect black jurors to leave their experience of race at the courthouse
door as it is preposterous to believe that white jurors have left theirs
outside.70 It is similarly absurd to presume that race blinds black jurors
when, as all jurors are supposed to do, they rely on their lived experience
to evaluate evidence. One set of experiences pervasive among black ju-
rors and unusual for whites is a history of unjust treatment by police.71
Numerous polls and studies have shown widespread suspicion of police
among minorities in general, and blacks in particular.72 This should not
be surprising; internal and independent investigations confirm that racial
bias and police misconduct go hand-in-hand in urban police depart-
ments.73 The most recent nationwide poll confirms that 60% of blacks
surveyed think blacks are treated less fairly than whites by police.74
68 See Black/White Relations in the United States, Gallup Poll Social Audit, PR New-
swire, June 10, 1997 available in WESTLAW, Allsnews database.
69 See supra text accompanying note 62.
70 See Karen Jo Koonan & Paul Harris, Confronting Racial Stereotypes in Jury Trials, in
CIVIL RIGHTS LMGATION AND A-rroRNEY FEES ANNuAL HANDBOOK 9, 302-16 (1993).
71 See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Driving While Black, in TImRTEEN WAYS OF LOOrNo AT
A BLACK MAN 110 (1997).
72 See Maria Puente, Poll: Blacks' Confidence in Police Plummets, USA TODAY, Mar.
21, 1995, at A3; supra note 68, at 9.
73 Independent studies confirming the almost universal experiences of blacks with police
include the Christopher Commission which studied the LAPD in the aftermath of the 1992
riots.
74 See supra note 68, at 9. By contrast, our studies indicate that only thirty percent of
whites think police treat African-Americans unfairly.
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Being stopped by police for no reason other than race is virtually a
universal experience for African-Americans. 75 New stories are con-
stantly reported. In June 1997, Harvard Law School Professor Patricia
Williams recounted the tale of a forty-year old black woman lawyer ar-
rested and held in a Manhattan jail for twenty-one hours for having a
suspended license and "resisting arrest."76
When some black jurors' experiences ,vith police leave them skepti-
cal of police claims, that does not make them nullifiers or racists. Such
skepticism can enhance deliberations. Though there are few articles
describing positive white response to black jurors' skeptical scrutiny of
police in the jury room, one such post-O.J. experience was reported by
Joan Biskupic in the Washington Post. She was a member of a mixed-
race jury which could not reach unanimity. She came to agree with the
questions about eyewitness testimony and police procedure raised by the
black jurors. 77
All jurors are supposed to treat police as they would other wit-
nesses, making individual decisions on their credibility. More whites
than blacks find it difficult to hold police to a stringent standard.78 In
fact, our research has found that potential jurors excused for cause, be-
cause they would lend greater weight to police testimony than to that of
other witnesses, are almost always white.
Many African-Americans also have a heightened awareness of ra-
cial inequities in the criminal justice system. According to a Gallup Poll,
72% believe that blacks are treated more harshly than whites by the crim-
inal justice system.79
Careful observers have documented how race, as well as national
origin and gender, permeates the justice system, from initial law enforce-
75 See Gates, supra note 71, at 151-53.
76 See Patricia Williams, The Climates of Disbelief, THE NATION, June 16, 1997, at 10.
77' See Joan Biskupic, , the Juror: Color-conscious Justice in a Post-O.J. Trial, WASH-
INGTON POST, Nov. 26, 1995, at C3. See also Joan Biskupic, Jury Verdicts Aren't Always So
Black and White, in RAC AND THE CRININAL JUSTICE SYsT-aaM: How RACE AFFEcrs JURY
TRIALs 46 (Gerald A. Reynolds ed., 1996).
78 A USA Today poll,'Gulf Separates Races in Dealings with Police, found that white
Americans are more willing than non-whites to presume that police and prosecutors are truth-
ful. See USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 1995, at A3; Bryan A. Stevenson and Ruth E. Friedman, Delib-
erate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 509, n.68 (1994). The effects of these differences in attitudes and behavior are routinely
seen in courtrooms.
79 See supra note 68, at 13 and accompanying text. By contrast, our studies indicate that
only 46% of whites believe that blacks are treated more harshly; see also Peggy C. Davis, Law
as Microagression, in CRmTICAL RACE THEoRY: THE CUrn G EDGE 169 (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995) (discussing a New York State court system study which found that blacks had good
reason to mistrust the system).
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ment decisions to sentencing. s0 Race and ethnicity remain a potent de-
terminant in sentencing. In some cases, non-whites are likely to receive
longer sentences than whites.81 The disparity in sentencing between
blacks and whites actually increased from 1984 to 1990.82 Today, all
sources agree that the U.S. prison population is over 45% black.83
Racial disparity in sentencing is starkest in the imposition of the
death penalty. Numerous studies have found that blacks are dispropor-
tionately sentenced to death.84 The most widely known study of this
pattern found overwhelming evidence of racial bias in death penalty sen-
tencing in Georgia and formed the basis for black death row inmate War-
ren McCleskey's appeal.85 As is well-known and widely deplored, in
McCleskey the Supreme Court accepted the validity of research findings
that grave racial disparities did exist,86 but they refused to overturn the
sentence, concluding that since "apparent" disparities are "inevitable,"
they are tolerable. 87 Is it any wonder that many blacks feel that the death
penalty is itself a form of discrimination, and that every national poll
examining the question has found that, while whites overwhelmingly ap-
prove of the death penalty, the majority of blacks oppose it?88
Under these circumstances, Professor Butler's suggestion that, in
some instances, nullification is the moral choice is by no means far-
fetched.89 He proposes nullification as a mechanism whereby jurors can
affirm their understanding that the actions of some black defendants are
"a predictable reaction to oppression" or "a reasonable response to the
80 See Hon. Arthur L. Burnett Sr., Permeation of Race, National Origin and Gender
Issues from Initial Law Enforcement Contact through Sentencing: The Need for Sensitivity,
Equality, and Vigilance in the Criminal Justice System, 31 AM. CraM. L. REv. 1153 (1994).
For an overview of the interplay of race, racism, and crime in the justice system see Kennedy,
supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81 See Marjorie S. Zatz, The Changing Forms of Racial/Ethnic Biases in Sentencing, 24
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 69, 85 (1987). The pattern is consistent in studies conducted
from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s despite variation in definitions of discrimination and control
of variables.
82 See Barbara R. Meirhoefer, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF
MANDATORY MI IUM PRISON TERMS (1992). In fact, mandatory minimum sentences are
more likely imposed on non-white than on white offenders. See Barbara S. Vincent & Paul J.
Hofer, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON
TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS 112, 117-21 (1994).
83 See Ian Fisher, Black Soldiers Wrestle With Tangled Notions of Race and Justice in
the Military, N.Y. Tuvms, June 17, 1997, at A12 (reporting 45%); THE SENTENCING PROJECr,
FACTS Anotrr PRmSONS AND PRISONERS (1997) (reporting 50% in 1993).
84 See Angela Dorn et al., Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v.
Kemp, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 437, 447 n.9 (1989).
85 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
86 See Johnson, supra note 7, at 1017; see also Dora, supra note 84, at 437-38.
87 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
88 See, e.g., Craig Haney et. al., "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on its Bias-
ing Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619, 629 (1994).
89 See Butler, supra note 41, at 690-91.
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racial and economic subordination every African-American faces every
day." 90 His recommendation, however, tells us little about the analysis
applied by black jurors who are accused of nullifying. Careful scrutiny
of the anecdotes reported in media sources reveals that the jurors in ques-
tion are not nullifying; instead, they are properly applying the rules. One
exploration of the supposed pattern of black juror nullification focuses on
cases in Washington, D.C.91 Prosecutors and judges there report an in-
crease in the number of juries ending in 11 to 1 votes for conviction with
the lone acquitting holdout being an African-American woman.92 While
the author Jeffrey Rosen decries a pattern of "angry woman" nullifiers,
he actually describes black jurors demanding high quality police work.93
Three cases are described. The holdouts are characterized as being
"irrational, eccentric, or simply angry ... refusing to listen or to per-
suade." 94 Each holdout is quoted directly, however, and what she says
about the evidence belies these characterizations. One juror rejected the
prosecution's case because the police lost the crime weapon.95 She
asked: "How could they lose the knife if there was really a knife?" 96
Rosen would have us believe that since the prosecutor acknowledged that
police "messed up," their ineptitude should be excused.
The second, a law school graduate who agonized about her decision
to acquit, was castigated for being "uncontrite" because she rejected the
credibility of police who told two different stories in describing the same
event.97 Rosen says that "nothing of consequence turned on the discrep-
ancy."98 He ignores the typical instruction that jurors carefully scrutinize
all the evidence including the witness's words, demeanor, or behavior in
90 Id. at 680. Professor Butler mentions preliminarily that nullification has been associ-
ated with individuals and groups that have "objectives quite contrary" to his own. Id. at 680,
n. 11. However, the power to nullify has a long and honorable history in the interest of polit-
ical activism and social change. In the rnid-19th century some defendants successfully ap-
pealed directly to jurors to ignore the Fugitive Slave Act. This led to a finding that while the
jury had the power to nullify, they should not be told to do so. See United States v. Morris, 26
F.Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.15,815). In the more recent past, opponents of the
Vietnam War, peace activists and draft resisters have appealed to the jury's power to nullify-
sometimes with success. The D.C. Circuit Court considered the question whether jurors
should be instructed on the power to nullify, and a divided court decided once again that
though the power exists, jurors should not be told of it. See United States v. Dougherty, 475
F.2d. 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
91 See Rosen, supra note 42, at 54-64.
92 See Rosen, supra note 42, at 55.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 56. In a clear distortion of the law, Rosen suggests that such jurors are being
seated because of limits imposed on the exercise of peremptory challenges under Batson. See
also supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
95 See Rosen, supra note 42, at 58 and accompanying text.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 62-63.
98 See id. at 62.
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judging the truthfulness, accuracy, and weight of testimony. 99 Jurors are
supposed to do this when evaluating any witness's credibility, including
police witnesses. If two lay witnesses disagreed about the same event,
would it not be appropriate to question their credibility?
In the third case, the prosecution bias is apparent in the case de-
scription: A police officer, after hearing a shot, obtained a description of
the car from which the shot was believed to have been fired and "pulled
it over and found packets of crack and the gun."'100 The holdout advocat-
ing acquittal is dismissed as a conspiracy theorist because she asked
"why didn't they dust for fingerprints? Maybe because he hadn't even
touched that gun." 101
One of Rosen's "angry" women felt that she was being asked to
"trust whatever the police say."10 2 She explicitly rejected this sugges-
tion, as all jurors should. The message in this article, as in others decry-
ing the sorry state of the newly color-sensitive jury system, is that the job
of jurors is to convict. Witness the very different treatment of a juror
who argued for conviction because, as he said, he was "sick of this going
on in my city.' 01 3 This juror is not criticized for bringing extraneous
bias to bear in reaching his conclusion. There is, moreover, no reference
to the possibility that his comment might reveal a true case of nullifica-
tion-reaching a decision based on moral outrage at broader social con-
ditions rather than on evidence.
Jurors who resist the moral panic response to crime and insist on
closely scrutinizing the prosecutor's case are treated as extremists. Why
is it irrational to expect the police to be able to hold onto the crime
weapon? What is eccentric about expecting two police officers who say
they observed the same event to tell the same story? (Unlike other peo-
ple, police are trained as observers and witnesses.) Why shouldn't the
police and prosecutor have to prove that the gun the police found is actu-
ally the one that was fired? Why should blacks be pilloried for acting on
their skepticism of a legal system that has been accused by a member of
its highest court of harboring "a fear of too much justice"?' 4
CONCLUSION
Black jurors are being attacked by white commentators for drawing
on their own experiences, even while the commentators endorse, in the-
99 See, e.g., SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, PENNSYLVANIA BAR
INSTITUTE § 2.02 (1979).
100 Rosen, supra note 42, at 63 (emphasis added).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 54.
104 See McCleskey, 481 U.S at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ory, the principle that diversity of experience belongs in the jury box.
No serious commentator today would suggest that the clock be turned
back on community participation in jury panels. Instead, the attacks on
black jurors betray an expectation that blacks should deny their own ex-
periences and adopt those of whites.
Surely this is racism-not the old fashioned kind, but the new-fash-
ioned kind. The kind where whites provide seemingly non-racial reasons
(e.g., "these jurors are not following the law") as the basis for racist
opinions. No doubt, the authors of each article criticized here would
deny believing that blacks are inferior and whites superior. 105 But how
else can we understand the demand that black jurors leave their exper-
iences at the courthouse door?
Jury trial remains a cornerstone of the U.S. justice system. Repre-
sentative juries, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, are a
requirement for public confidence in the system. Attacks on black jurors
who bring their experiences into this system are attacks on representa-
tiveness. These attacks undermine public confidence in the system,
erode fundamental rules of the justice system, and pose threats to fairness
in future trials.
105 Denial of racism is a key psychological factor in its continued existence. See Johnson,
supra note 7, at 1029-30.
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